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─ABSTRACT ─ 
 
 
The paper provides an overview of the generation of electricity in 10 countries in South East 
Europe during 1995-2004. Using the latest available statistics the potential of the nascent 
integration of the electricity markets in South East Europe is explored. We conduct a cross-
country analysis of electricity production based on different types of fuel used. The region has 
a low level of gasification combined with few nuclear power generation facilities, while some 
countries heavily rely on hydro electric generation. Differences in countries’ resource 
endowment and the possibility of intertemporaral substitution between electricity generated 
from various fuels could stimulate a regional trade in electricity. Such trade could displace a 
proportion of the required investment in the construction of  generation facilities, as an 
alternative to nationally independent energy policies. Finally, we consider the environmental 
impact of electricity generation, and identify some of the key trade-offs between different 
policy objectives. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
During the last decade South East Europe (SEE) witnessed the collapse of the 
socialist system and several wars, which deeply affected the social and economic life 
of people in the region. The last conflict ended in 1999 and was followed by 
peacekeeping operations in Bosnia, Kosovo and a limited NATO engagement in 
Macedonia. The years of war damaged and in places completely destroyed electricity 
generation and transmission infrastructure that was already suffering degradation due 
to economic decline. Finally, after a long period of turbulence, the South East Europe 
(SEE) region enters a period of economic growth and investment opportunities. 
Currently, significant attention is focused on the energy sector and, particularly, on 
electricity, which is vital to economic growth and the prosperity of the region.  
 
The history of regional integration in SEE has been outlined earlier in this volume1. 
Critically, in 2005 the nations and territories of the region entered a legally binding 
agreement, the Energy Treaty which established the Energy Community of South East 
Europe (ECSEE), and committed the parties to the formation of a regional electricity 
market. All are new or aspiring members of the European Union (EU), and are 
therefore implicitly or explicitly required to implement EU Energy Policy, at to 
pursue its three fundamental objectives, competitiveness, security of supply and 
sustainability.  
 
This paper provides an overview of electricity generation in 10 countries2 in SEE 
between 1995 and 2004. We conduct a cross-country comparison of electricity 
production based on fuel type, then consider the environmental impact of electricity 
generation, and outline some of the key trade-offs between different policy objectives. 
This enables us to explore regional as well as national questions and to discuss 
potential demand and supply risks that the region and each country separately might 
face in the near future.  
 
Economic development in SEE has been and remains a focus of activity by several 
international organizations including the World Bank, European Commission (EC), 
European Bank of Reconstruction and Development as well as development agencies 
in the USA, Germany and Canada. The energy sector has been the subject of 
particularly active engagement and a series of influential studies has ensued.  
 
                                                 
1 Forthcoming in Utilities Policy, 2008. See also EPRG0725  Michael Pollitt 
Evaluating the evidence on electricity reform: Lessons for the South East Europe (SEE) market 
http://www.electricitypolicy.org.uk/pubs/index.html?year=2007 
2 Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, FYR Macedonia, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, 
Slovenia, Turkey.  
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A World Bank working paper by Kennedy and Besant-Jones (2004) sets out the 
strategy of the Bank with respect to the development of the SEE regional electricity 
market, focusing on risks the region as whole might face, and possible ways to deal 
with them. The South East Europe Generation Investment Study (GIS, 2005) and the 
subsequent updated version (GIS Update, 2007) present forecasts of demand and 
generation to 2020 for several plausible scenarios and from their simulations, generate 
estimates of required investments in electricity infrastructure in the region. The 
reports cover nine territorial entities: Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Kosovo, 
Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, and Serbia. Kennedy and Besant-Jones (2004) 
and GIS (2005) report that there was very limited investment in generation capacity 
during the 1990s; currently the average age of electricity generation plants is around 
thirty years. Therefore, without significant investment in refurbishment and new 
plant, and the improvement of interconnections between countries, the region will 
become increasingly dependent on imported electricity or even face shortages. Indeed, 
in late 2005 Tirana experienced widespread power cuts of up to 18 hours duration due 
to poor reliability and particularly dry hydrological conditions (Economist, 2006).  
 
Academic studies of the restructuring of electricity markets in both developed and 
developing countries are numerous. Davies, Wright and Waddams Price (2005) 
outline various privatization and regulation issues that developing countries may face, 
with a particular focus on the sequence of reforms. Both Tompson (2004) and Pittman 
(2007) provide a detailed description of the restructuring of the electricity sector in 
Russia. Other studies identify useful lessons which could be drawn from the 
developed countries that recently liberalized, privatized and restructured their 
electricity sector. Arocena and Waddams (2002) empirically assess differences 
between state and private electricity  generating  companies in Spain. Using data on 
physical units, the authors show that privately owned generating companies are 
moving faster toward the efficiency frontier. Jamasb (2002) and Jamasb, Mota, 
Newberry and Pollitt (2005) review different reform experiences in developing 
countries, and stress the importance of effective institutions in achieving desirable 
outcomes. 
 
In this analysis we used the International Energy Agency (IEA) data on annual 
national electricity production and consumption for OECD and Non-OECD countries 
for the period of 1995-2004. 3  
 
We briefly consider examples of electricity market integration in Europe, and against 
this background, provide an overview of the rationale for electricity market 
integration, an exploratory analysis of electricity generation in the region and consider 
the potential environmental impact of pursuing a generation expansion plan of the 
required magnitude to meet demand growth. 
 
INTEGRATING NATIONAL MARKETS 
 
In 1991 Norwegian electricity markets were deregulated and competition was 
introduced in generation and supply. 4  In 1996 Sweden took up the challenge of 
deregulation, a common spot-market, NordPool became the first multi-national power 
                                                 
3 The access to the IEA database was kindly provided by the UK Economic and Social Data Service 
(www.esds.ac.uk). 
4 Transmission and distribution remained regulated monopolies.  
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exchange and steps were taken to reduce barriers to cross-border trade. Finland 
completed the deregulation process in 1997, and finally in 2000 the Nordic market 
was fully integrated when Denmark East became a NordPool power exchange area.  
 
There are several important things to note about this process and local conditions. 
First, it took almost ten years to complete integration, and as late as 1998 the Nordic 
Electricity Market was regarded as an ‘emerging’ market (Amundsen et al., 1998). 
Second, prior to 1991 trade between Norway and Sweden was conducted through 
bilateral contracts, and while NordPool Spot is now a liquid market and trading 
volumes are over 60% of total electricity consumption in the Nordic countries,5 as in 
1998 less than 20% of total electricity consumption of Norway, Sweden and Finland 
was traded in the spot market (Bergman and Vaitilingam 1999).   
 
Third, although the received wisdom holds that the key driver for integration was 
legislation by the European Commission, there is increasing recognition of the view 
that the establishment of the Nordic Market was the outcome of a ‘gentleman’s 
agreement’; it suited the strategic plans of the market participants and governments 
concerned (Lundberg 2007). Fourth, the integration of the Nordic Market was 
initiated at a time of relative surplus in generating capacity and transmission 
constraints were not generally binding.  
 
Integration of electricity markets in Belgium-France-Netherlands, the so-called 
trilateral coupling (TLC) started in November 2006. By early 2007 these markets 
were already exhibiting a considerable degree of price convergence, and for the 
period November 2006 – August 2007, the region shared a single price for 58% of 
hours (APX, 2007). In February 2007 proposals were announced for Germany and 
Luxembourg to join, to form the Central West European market.  It is worth noting 
that the time taken to operationalise integration appears to be significantly different in 
the two cases considered. A single price area in the Nordic market was established 
over many years, while it apparently evolved in a matter of months in the TLC.  There 
may be many reasons for this difference, but critically, the TLC involved the 
integration of markets where actors were already accustomed to trading electricity; 
wholesale market competition was introduced in 1998, and  perhaps more 
importantly, the market infrastructure and rules were well established and market 
participants had built up a body of experience.  It is therefore arguable that the 
integration process took place over a comparable period of time6.  
 
The fundamental motivation for trade is to minimise costs by dispatching the cheapest 
plant available for each period, and the rationale for integrating national electricity 
markets is to maximise cross-border capacity and adopt rules and procedures for 
efficient cross border trade such that the consumers of the nations concerned benefit 
(CREG 2005). Benefits accruing from the effects of market integration can be thought 
of as falling into three groups. First, in terms of developing competitive (cost-
reflective) prices. Where vertically integrated systems are too small for intra-national 
competition to be workable, integrating national networks inevitably reduces market 
concentration and may constrain the potential to exercise market power. Amundsen et 
al. (1998) find that in the presence of market power and monopolistic pricing, free 
                                                 
5 http://www.nordpoolspot.com/about/ 
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trade in electricity between nations might provide an effective substitute for 
competition at the national level, particularly where there is considerable variation in 
prices. Additionally, larger markets can support more liquid wholesale markets which 
discipline market participants and encourage cost-reflective pricing.  
 
A second group of effects concerns security of supply. Centrally co-ordinated 
dispatch over a region with a non-synchronous peak requires, on average, a lower 
reserve margin than required under national operation. Similarly, diverse resource 
endowments and generating technologies across the region could offer greater 
resilience to external shocks, given adequate interconnection capacity. For example, a 
system in which a substantial proportion of electricity is generated from hydro may be 
vulnerable to persistent dry hydrological conditions, as in the case of Albania 
mentioned above. Lastly, the failure of a reasonably sized generator in a small system 
would compromise the stability of the entire system but may have only a modest 
impact in a larger system.  
 
The last effects we consider concern sustainability. Stewardship of scarce (fossil fuel) 
resources can be improved if the optimal fuel mix is considered at a regional level. 
For example, nations relying heavily on coal generation could import from nations 
with surplus power generated from, say, hydro, simultaneously minimising CO2 
emissions and utilising a renewable energy source.  An expanded market also offers 
increased opportunities for innovation (Neuhoff, 2006) and the adoption of low-
carbon technologies that may not be feasible for small system. 
 
 
ELECTRICITY GENERATION IN SOUTH EAST EUROPE 
 
Generation by Volume 
 
The generation of electricity in South East Europe increased from 299.8 TWh in 1995 
to 400.0 TWh in 2004, i.e. 33% increase over 10 years. However, most of the growth 
in the generation of electricity in the region is attributed to Turkey and Greece (see 
Graph 1).  
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Between 1995 and 2004, the greatest increase in generation was achieved by Turkey, 
which raised output from 86.2 TWh to 150.6 TWh (74% increase). Greece increased 
its production by 43% from 41.5 TWh to 59.3 TWh over the same period. Therefore, 
the additional production of Turkey and Greece together accounted for 82% of the 
total increase; 82.2 out of 100.2 TWh. 
  
In Turkey this was achieved largely through the increased use of gas fired plant. In 
1995 Turkey produced 16.6 TWh from gas, but by 2004 this had risen to 62.2 TWh 
(287% increase).  The additional gas fired generation was therefore 45.6 TWh, while 
the total increase in the production of electricity in Turkey using all types of fuel over 
the 10 year period was 64.4 TWh. Thus, natural gas accounts for 70% of the increase 
in the overall electricity production in Turkey. The realisation of plans to build  gas 
pipelines from Russia and the Caspian region would facilitate the further expansion of  
generation capacity, and potentially increase the share of gas-based electricity in 
Turkey in the short-run. 
 
Taken together, the remaining eight countries in the region increased generation by 
18.0 TWh over the last 10 years. However, between 1995 and 1999 overall electricity 
production in these countries stayed almost unchanged (171.9 TWh in 1995 and 170.2 
TWh in 1999), and only after 1999 did we begin to observe growth in electricity 
production in these countries, from 170.3 TWh in 1999 to 190.0 TWh in 2004 (i.e. 
extra 19.7 TWh over 5 years).  
 
After the end of the war in 1995, Bosnia and Herzegovina increased production from 
4.4 TWh in 1995 to 7.3 TWh in 1996 and then to 12.9 TWh in 2004 (186% increase 
over 10 years). Croatia also slowly recovered after years of war and economic 
embargo; electricity production increased from 8.8 TWh in 1995 to 13.3 TWh in 2004 
(49% increase over 10 years). 
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Romania initially experienced a sharp decline in electricity production between 1995 
and 1999 and only in 2000 did this trend reverse. A similar pattern of decline and 
increase is observed in Bulgaria and Serbia. In the mid-1990s all three countries 
experienced an economic slow down, which was exacerbated by the 1998 financial 
crisis in Russia, an important supplier of natural resources and a major trading 
partner. Additionally, Serbia’s involvement in military conflicts prompted the United 
Nations impose an embargo upon it.  However, since the end of the last war in the 
region in 1999,  all three countries have increased their electricity output, while over 
the same 10 year period production remained almost unchanged in Albania, 
Macedonia and Slovenia. 
 
 
Generation by Fuel Type 
 
The structure of the production of electricity by different types of fuel in South East 
Europe in 2004 is the following: 39% coal, 27% hydro, 22% gas, 7% nuclear, and 5% 
oil (in 2003 the numbers respectively were 40%, 23%, 23%, 7% and 7%).  
 
Graph 2:    SEE electricity production by type of fuel, 2004
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As we explained above, the main producer of electricity using natural gas was 
Turkey. In 2004 the SEE region produced 86.5 TWh from natural gas including 
Turkey’s contribution of 62.2 Wh (i.e. 71% of the total). Moreover, Turkey has the 
highest gasification of the electricity production in the region, with natural gas 
accounting for some 41% of Turkish production in 2004.  Other  countries that 
produce significant proportions of their electricity from natural gas are Romania 
(19%), Croatia (19%) and Greece (16%) (see Graph 3). Gasification in the remainder 
of the region is low, and here gas plants are supplemented with nuclear power 
generation facilities. Three countries in SEE that have nuclear power stations: 
Bulgaria, Slovenia, and Romania, although the Krsko nuclear power plant in Slovenia 
is jointly owned by Croatia and Slovenia and the generated electricity is equally split 
between them. In Bulgaria, the nuclear plant in Kozloduy produced 16.8 TWh, which 
contributed 41% to the country’s electricity production in 2003. It was agreed with the 
European Commission that two units of the nuclear plant would be retired in 2006, 
while the other two units will remain available till 2020 (GIS, 2005). Romania has 
one unit at its Cernavoda nuclear power station, and might build another two units at 
the same location (680MW each). 
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As Graph 3 shows, most of the countries in SEE rely heavily on coal (lignite and 
brown coal) based generation.. For example, Macedonia produced 78% of its 
electricity using coal in 2004; while the figures for Serbia and Greece are 66% and 
61% respectively. The dependency on coal for generation in other countries is as 
follows: Bosnia 52%, Bulgaria 45%, Romania 38%, Slovenia 34%, Turkey 23% and 
Croatia 16%. Most of the coal burned in thermal power plants is domestically 
supplied, however, high costs of production caused by low productivity and lack of 
investment in equipment and technology render many mining companies (which are 
typically state owned) unprofitable. Nevertheless, governments are forced to continue 
to subsidize the sector in order to prevent numerous lay-offs and the consequential 
social problems. 
 
Albania is the only country in the region that does not burn a significant amount of 
coal for electricity production. The country relies completely on hydro power plants 
while Croatia and Bosnia produce 53% and 47% of their electricity from hydro. Other 
main producers of hydro electricity are Serbia (31%), Turkey (31%), Romania (29%), 
Slovenia (27%) and Macedonia (22%).  
 
Differences in countries’ resource endowment and the possibility of intertemporal 
substitution in the fuel mix could stimulate a regional trade in electricity, potentially 
reducing the required investment in new generation capacity. A typical substitution is 
between hydro and thermal power in peak and off-peak periods. Reservoirs are filled 
during off-peak hours and  water is subsequently released to meet the  peak demand. 
Such substitution would facilitate matching supply and demand at peak periods, so 
improving system reliability and region-wide capacity reserve. In addition the GIS 
(2005) reports differences in fuel costs across countries, so there is potential to utilize 
the comparative advantages of some countries in the production of relatively cheap 
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electricity for later consumption in other countries. Such types of regional electricity 
cooperation and trading could provide great benefits to consumers through lower 
prices and more reliable electricity supply, though crucially, would require the 
adoption of an alternative model to historical nationally independent energy policies 
7.    
 
In common with the Nordic countries at liberalization, reserve margins in SEE as a 
whole are apparently comfortable (SEETEC 2006), though anecdotal evidence 
suggests that the level of available capacity is, in some countries, far below installed 
capacity, which makes national systems vulnerable to supply shocks, such as the low  
Albanian rainfall in 2005 noted above.  If the Nordic experience of a virtual halt of 
investment in generation and transmission during and immediately after market 
liberalisation was to be repeated in the SEE region it would have a catastrophic effect 
on the ability of the system to meet peak demand. Experience of more advanced 
transition economies and of regional economic growth implies sharply increasing 
demand for electricity and recent studies have highlighted the urgent need for 
substantial investment in generation and transmission capacity, especially investment 
in cross-border interconnectors, if the electricity sector is to underpin rather than 
constrain future economic growth.  
 
 
DRIVERS OF DEMAND  
 
Understanding the drivers of demand allows us to consider the potential implications 
of market liberalisation and the development of a regional market for electricity. The 
expected change in the pattern of demand will have a significant impact on the timing 
and nature of required investment in generation capacity. Given the imperative of 
achieving real-time balance, investment in generation capacity is driven by peak 
demand. In the context of rising base-load demand associated with economic growth, 
increased peakiness implies earlier investment in new plant if system stability at peak 
hours is to be maintained (Stoft, 2002). Fundamental to this will be the exposure of all 
consumers to cost reflective prices, inducing demand side responses relating to the 
availability and relative prices of substitute fuels. Plans for market opening will be 
determined nationally, and are not yet synchronised, which may exacerbate the 
volatility of demand.  
 
The region currently experiences a winter peak though there is considerable variation 
at national level (Greece and Turkey are summer peaking systems). In the long run, 
there is an expectation that ECSEE nations will converge on the Croatian seasonal 
pattern: summer demand as a proportion of the total increasing, winter as a proportion 
falling, and fairly stable demand in autumn and spring. This greater seasonal 
variation, which may be exaggerated by variance in the speed of convergence to a 
regional pattern, will depend on both macroeconomic factors, notably realised 
economic growth and structural shifts, and the degree of effective energy market 
restructuring.  
                                                 
7 The experience of the USA shows that while increased cross-border trade has lots of potential to 
lower prices and costs overall, there are losers, at least in the short term, who will fight this reform (for 
instance, the current customers of low-cost power whose supplies may be diverted to higher-priced 
neighboring areas). Of course they could be compensated from the gains in efficiency and profits, but 
they fear that they won't be, and it has significantly slowed state-level reforms. 
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Average annual load growth is 1.3% in the main UCTE block,8 though for 2005 in 
SEE variation from 2004 levels ranged from +2% in Bulgaria to +7.8% in FYR 
Macedonia. The pace of growth may be expected to increase after 2010; prior to this, 
improved energy efficiency and reduced energy intensity are expected to partially 
offset increasing demand (Kennedy, 2004). 
  
As discussed above, the region’s non-synchronous peak load may permit more 
efficient use of generation and transmission assets if dispatch is coordinated 
regionally rather than nationally, mitigating the implied requirement for early 
investment. Further, centralised dispatch of the heterogeneous regional generation 
mix may reduce the reserve capacity required and improve security of supply 
associated with any given load.  
 
The precise effect of energy efficiency measures on demand is difficult to determine 
though can be approximated by trends in electricity intensity. However, three sources 
of energy efficiency are worth noting. First, more advanced transitional economies 
have experienced substantial improvements in energy efficiency (EBRD, 2006), 
partly as higher (cost-reflective) prices have driven substitution and investment 
towards less energy intensive processes and partly from increased awareness of the 
opportunities and the implementation of energy-efficiency measures introduced 
through regulatory and policy reform.  
 
Second, efficiencies derived from reduced losses. The development and 
implementation of robust collection mechanisms at the supply level is expected to 
reduce non-technical losses from relatively high current levels measured on a regional 
basis. Investment in transmission and distribution networks and interconnector 
capacity is expected to reduce technical losses. The most efficient countries in the 
region in terms of distribution losses of electricity are Greece and Slovenia with 8% 
and 4% of distribution losses, respectively. In a sharp contrast to these two countries, 
Albania is losing more than 30% of its domestically supplied electricity due to 
inefficient transmission and distribution networks. For the remainder of the region this 
ratio lies in the interval of 10-20% of losses.  
 
All countries in the region have experienced increased in the use of electricity per 
capita over the period we consider.9 This ratio is considered to be a good proxy to the 
economic development of a country, since it captures a disposable volume of 
electricity for all types of economic activity . Turkey and Albania are characterized by 
a very low domestic supply of electricity per capita, and while per capita consumption 
of electricity in these two countries is almost three times lower than in the most 
economically developed countries in the region (Greece and Slovenia), they are net 
importers.  Thus, the anticipated economic development in Turkey and Albania will 
increase the demand for electricity and, absent significant investment in generation 
and transmission capacity, their dependence on imported electricity must also rise, 
                                                 
8 The "Union for the Co-ordination of Transmission of Electricity" (UCTE) is the association of 
transmission system operators in continental Europe. 
9 This parameter is calculated as a ratio of domestically supplied electricity to the size of population in 
a country. Domestically supplied electricity is equal to the totally produced electricity in a country 
adjusted by the net export of electricity. However, domestically supplied electricity includes both 
technical and non-technical losses that occur at the stage of transmission and distribution to final 
consumers.  
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and is expected to converge to the regional and European average. Bosnia and 
Romania are in a slightly different situation. While domestic supply per capita is also 
low, they are currently are net exporters of electricity. It follows from the logic above, 
that without expansion of generation facilities, the export potential of Bosnia and 
Romania will decrease over time, and at some point could become net importers of 
electricity as Slovenia did in 2003. 
 
TRADE 
 
The varied import/export status of countries implies different policy choices, for 
example, choice of tariff regulation regimes, ownership structure, sequencing of 
reforms, the degree of liberalization, and the choice of pricing mechanism. 
 
The region as a whole and most countries within it are net importers of electricity, 
including the biggest producer , Turkey. The largest exporter, Bulgaria was the only 
country to export on a monthly basis throughout 2005. The other net exporters are 
Bosnia and Romania. Slovenia was a net exporter for all years in our dataset except 
2003. It is interesting to note that three of the four net exporters in the region are also 
nuclear energy producers. 
Graph 4:            Net Export, 1995-2004
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SEE as a region is a net importer. There was a dramatic increase in import volumes 
between 1995 and 2002, from 1837 GWh to  5549 GWh,  followed by a decrease  to 
2657 GWh in 2003. The recent substantial decrease in the electricity dependency of 
the region can largely be explained by a significant improvement in the net export of 
electricity to Turkey, which reduced its negative electricity trade balance from -3000 
GWh in 2002 to +681 GWh in 2003. 
 
Cross border flows inside SEE and with Central Europe have improved since 2004 as 
a result of the reconnection of the two UCTE zones. As discussed above, introducing 
competition into electricity markets relies significantly on fostering competitive 
pressures that derive from diverse resource endowments and comparative advantage. 
Thus cross border trade will be crucial to the liberalisation of electricity markets in 
SEE.  A recent simulation modelling exercise of the SEE system excluding Turkey 
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and Greece generated some tentative conclusions regarding possible outcomes of a 
competitive, fully liberalised wholesale market (REKK, 2007). Key results were that 
Bulgaria and Romania are low-cost exporters within the region, that prices in central 
and western parts of the region are strongly influenced by those in neighbouring 
countries outside the region, and that under certain conditions, weak interconnection 
and inadequate domestic generation capacity results in Macedonia and Albania 
becoming a high-priced sub-region.  
 
 
INSTALLED CAPACITY AND MARKET POWER 
 
In order to maintain an economic growth in South East European countries there is an 
urgent need to increase electricity generation, improve efficiency and find reliable 
partners to supply deficient amounts through import. As a result of these 
considerations the prime concern of the countries and international bodies involved is 
to create the conditions such that domestic and foreign investors are willing to build 
new generation facilities and rehabilitate the existing ones. However, not much 
attention is paid to a potential problem of the abuse of market power within each 
country as well as across the whole or part of the region The companies in possession 
of marginal generation capacity might exercise their market power at the time of peak 
demand by withholding electricity from the market or artificially creating congestion 
in the transmission system. Such strategic behavoir would enable companies to 
profitably increase prices above competitive levels. 
 
Table 1 presents the largest power stations in each country in terms of installed 
capacity, approximate market shares as well as fuel type. Traditionally, nuclear, coal 
and run of river hydro facilities usually run as baseload, while gas/oil plants and 
hydro with storage ponds are more flexible and therefore distpatched mid-merit and to 
meet peak demand. In a competitive market then, these plants could be dispatched in 
response to price signals. We note that generation facilities in SEE commonly operate 
well below their installed capacity due to poor reliability, including degraded 
infrastructure. Another issue is that a hydro power station might be a part of a large 
hydro complex (cascade) therefore in case of privatization it would be sold as one 
package, and the total installed capacity of the newly created entity would be much 
greater. Therefore, this table indicates just a potential for the exercise of the market 
power in each country. 
 
Table 1. Largest power stations in each country in 2005 by installed capacity, 
approximate market share and type of fuel used.  
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Source: GIS (2005) and national electricity regulators’ websites. 
 
In most small countries there are just a few generation facilities and the biggest four 
producers control a significant proportion of the total installed capacity. For example, 
in Montenegro there are only 3 producers and in Kosovo one. In Albania, Macedonia, 
Serbia the largest 4 producers hold 92%, 78% and 78% of the total generation 
capacities respectively. While in Turkey, Romania and Croatia the top four producers 
hold less significant proportions of the total generation capacity (19%, 30%, 39% 
respectively).    
 
As we noted above, it would be difficult or impossible to develop a competitive 
electricity market within smaller SEE systems,  but competition could be introduced 
to these through participation in the regional electricity market. As a consequence we 
might expect the biggest supporters of the regional market to be industrial and 
residential consumers and policy makers in these small countries, because it would be 
one of a very few ways to put a competitive pressure on dominant players in their 
countries. Obviously these groups will face a strong resistance from dominant players, 
who will try to protect their market power. Larger countries (Turkey, Romania, 
Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece) do have sufficient scale to develop a competitive market 
within their borders. Policymakers should take careful steps while privatizing and 
reforming the electricity sector in these countries to minimize chances of the abuse 
market power by a newly created or reformed companies, that might obtain an ability 
to strategically exercise market power through marginal capacities within countries’ 
borders. 
 
Another important issue is that, as privatization is rolled out across the region, large 
multinational energy companies, for example, ENI, ENEL and CEZ are investing in 
generation facilities as well as distribution companies. ENEL is active in distribution 
and generation in Bulgaria, Romania and Greece. CEZ (a Czech Republic based 
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energy group) acquired generation and distribution  facilities in Bulgaria and 
Romania. ENI is building stakes in generation, transmission and distribution 
electricity and gas companies in Turkey, Romania, Croatia, Slovenia and Greece. 
Given the limited scale of privatization in the region, these energy companies are not  
as yet able to exercise market power in each separate countries or the region. 
However, with the opening of national markets and the establishment of the regional 
market, they might acquire marginal capacities across a country or the whole/part of 
the region, enabling them to manipulate prices. Those who design and implement 
regional market policies should be aware of this fact and put safeguards in place to 
minimize competition problems in the future. 
 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF ELECTRICITY GENERATION 
 
Consideration of environmental impacts is critical to a comprehensive study of 
electricity generation, but is particularly appropriate where the market under 
consideration includes transition economies.  Power generation in OECD countries 
accounts for some 38% of energy related CO2 emissions, a share that is expected to 
remain approximately stable to 2030. But in transition economies, the share in 2002 
was some 52%, and IEA data shows that by 2030 it will still represent 47% of the 
total (IEA, 2004). Given the impending generation gap in the region, and the implied 
generation expansion, this suggests that the power sector has the potential to make a 
meaningful contribution to a reduction in regional emissions of green house gases 
(GHG).  
 
In accordance with Decision 2002/358/EC , Directive 2003/87/EC requires that, by 
2008 to 2012 the Community and its Member States (MS) collectively reduce 
anthropogenic GHG emissions by 8% relative to 1990 levels, and recognises the 
longer term requirement to reduce GHG emissions by 70% relative to 1990 levels. 
The key mechanism for achieving this commitment is the EU Emissions Trading 
Scheme (EU ETS) for CO2, introduced in 2005. Others include targets for electricity 
production from renewable energy sources and energy efficiency. While MSs are 
obliged to implement EC legislation in full, many of the ECSEE members are not as 
yet MSs,  so do not share this obligation. However, we note that the prospect of 
membership is an incentive for would-be MSs to adopt emissions reduction targets 
and measures that would bring them into compliance with the Directive by some date 
after 2012.  
 
We now discuss the factors that have the potential to influence progress towards these 
challenges and objectives in a competitive market. The drivers of demand for 
electricity were outlined above, and clearly policies and actions that influence these 
drivers will have an impact on system load and hence on total emissions. However 
demand is not the subject of this section.  On the supply side, upgrading transmission 
and  distribution infrastructure would reduce losses, and investment in low carbon 
generating technologies would reduce emissions associated with a given capacity. 
Taken together, such investments could substantially improve the productive 
efficiency of a system, particularly if the infrastructure is partially degraded and 
where generation plant is old and possibly unreliable. 
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However, it is the generation mix, not the capacity mix, that determines realised 
emissions. Under standard economic assumptions generators can be expected to 
minimize long-run costs, and since electricity generation is very capital intensive, 
with capital costs amounting to around 50% of total costs, marginal costs of 
production are dominated by fuel and operations and maintenance costs.  Which 
brings us to the third factor, the price mechanism. At the most basic level, price 
competition is a mechanism for matching demand and supply, and the efficiency of 
this mechanism rests absolutely on the correct pricing of externalities. Moving to a 
carbon-constrained environment therefore requires that CO2 a damaging externality of 
industrial production, and of electricity production in particular, enters generators’ 
cost function, so inducing a shift towards less carbon intensive electricity production 
over time. Thus policies that bring about closer alignment between true social costs 
and prices will improve efficiency. The EU ETS is an example of just such a policy as 
are schemes to support renewable energy sources (RES) such as Germany’s Feed In 
Tariff.  
 
We will return to discuss the feasibility of assuming that a nascent market such as that 
in ECSEE can deliver the emissions savings promised by a competitive market. Next 
we shift focus onto the projected impact of planned capacity expansion on the 
generation mix in SEE and hence actual emissions. 
 
Graph 5 charts projected total CO2 emissions for the ECSEE under a range of 
scenarios presented in the recent GIS Update (2007)10.  The study simulated a least 
cost power development plan for ECSEE given a loss of load probability of less than 
one day per year and certain assumptions regarding existing committed expenditure 
on rehabilitating existing plant and investment in new plant and for a plausible range 
of fuel prices. It is worth noting that the study assumed operating the system as one 
integrated regional system.  One objective of the study was to calculate the impact 
implied by specific carbon prices on the amount of CO2 generated and on the change 
in the technology mix. 
 
                                                 
10 Unfortunately the GIS data does not cover Greece or Turkey, and it should be stressed that this 
analysis therefore does not include the impact of these countries.  
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Graph 5.  CO2 Emissions for Various Scenarios 
Data source: GIS Update (2007)  
 
Graph 5 shows the two reference cases, basecase with justified (on a least cost basis) 
rehabilitation and official investment plans (BJR and BOR), which can be regarded as 
‘business as usual’ in that they focus on rehabilitation of existing thermal power 
plants (TPP) and investment in new TPP. From a total capacity in 2005 of around 
42,817 MW , the simulation for BOR resulted in 11,574 MW rehabilitation (BJR 
9,361), and 11,022 MW new capacity (BJR 12,696) all of which burn fossil fuels. 
Unsurprisingly, both generate projected increases in emissions for the region as a 
whole, but the degree of increase, some 60% over the planning period (to 2020) is 
alarming.  
 
A further two scenarios assume carbon prices of €20 and €30 CO2/t.  A  CO2 price of  
€20/t is associated with 4,573 MW rehabilitation and 16,634 MW new build. Of this 
capacity expansion suggested by the simulation, all is TPP 11 . What the scenario 
suggests then, is that compared with no carbon price, less than half the rehabilitation 
of existing TPP is cost effective, but rather it becomes efficient to invest in new 
technologies with comparatively lower carbon footprints. These include 2.500MW 
Kosovo lignite, 7,900 MW combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) and 3,000MW 
imported coal. 
 
The model then associates this capacity mix with a large increase in (relatively clean) 
gas and a reduction in lignite production. At this carbon price fossil fuels account for 
51.7% of capacity,  but only 42.5% actual generation. This is largely explained by the 
                                                 
11 With the exception of pre-committed and financed nuclear plants Belene in Bulgaria (960MW) and 
Cernavoda in Romania (2x680MW). 
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share of nuclear capacity of 10.4% but generation from nuclear plants of 19.9%. 
While the model does not suggest additional investment in nuclear at €20 CO2/t, there 
is about 2,400 MW nuclear pre-committed and pre-financed.  
 
At €30 CO2/t., no rehabilitation is cost-effective so the simulations suggest existing 
TPP would be retired instead, and to maintain the LOLP assumed 21,259 MW new 
capacity would be installed over the planning horizon. Additionally, 5,000 MW of 
new nuclear is built, along with 7,900MW CCGT, 2,500 Kosovo lignite and 
2,500MW imported coal. While in this scenario 64.9% installed capacity is fossil fuel, 
only 53% generation is in TPP. Again the suggested production from nuclear, at 27%,  
is disproportionate to installed capacity at 14.8%. At this price, for all other fuels, the 
model resulted in production approximately proportionate to installed capacity.  
  
Given the potential for hydro power plants (HPP) in the region, the model was also 
run for scenarios in which  around 2,000 MW HPP were ‘forced’ into the system. As 
Graph 5 shows, this made almost no difference to total emissions under either of the 
CO2 price scenarios. This is due to the comparatively low contribution relative to the 
system size.  
 
So what can we conclude from this analysis? As discussed repeatedly throughout this 
and other papers in this volume, electricity market integration in South East Europe 
has the potential to deliver significant benefits  relative to the operation of separate 
national systems. But even assuming optimising at a regional rather than national 
level, CO2 emissions implied by the two business as usual scenarios shown in Graph 
5, BOR and BJR, are some 60% higher than those in 2005. The mechanisms by which 
this increase in emissions may be mitigated in a competitive market were discussed 
above, and it is clear from the GIS Update that introducing a price for CO2  has a 
significant effect on the investment decisions of generators such that emissions may 
be controlled and potentially even reduced.  
 
There are, however, obstacles to realisation of these potential gains. First, as the 
recent Quarterly Report on progress in electricity published by ECS makes clear, 
there is, as yet, limited progress in putting in place a framework that might incentivise 
generators to produce from RES. The heterogeneous nature of the systems in the 
region, and the fact that only the larger nations are MSs of the EU contribute further 
complexity to the task of developing a coherent regional policy on which all can 
agree. The development of effective policy in this area is challenging, but particularly 
so when set against the backdrop of market liberalisation and the introduction of 
competition into national markets. The second possible problem relates to the CO2 
price. The model developed in the GIS Update (2007) shows that a CO2 price of €30 
would be required to keep emissions at approximately current levels. As we ener the 
second trading period of the EU ETS, we observe that over the 12 months to 17 
January 2008 EU Emissions Allowance (EUA) futures for 2009 delivery have 
climbed from a low of approximately €12 to around €2312. While it is still early days, 
clearly the EUA price is moving in the right direction.  
 
                                                 
12  Source: European Energy Exchange website 
http://www.eex.com/en/Market%20Information/Emission%20Allowances/EU%20Carbon%20Futures
%20%7C%20Derivatives accessed 08-01-17. 
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Environmental sustainability is an explicit objective of EU energy policy, and thus of 
ECSEE nations. Indeed the majority have ratified the Kyoto Protocol or expect to do 
so. But we argue that it may be at odds with other policy objectives. Or to be more 
precise, that there is a significant trade-off to be made between the objectives 
embodied in EU energy policy (Roller, et al. 2007) as well as between EU energy 
policy and EU competition policy which is primarily concerned with the creation of a 
Single European Market, and implies reduced prices. We suggest that the approach to 
energy policy formulation outlined in the Electricity Transition Strategy is likely to 
prove insufficiently robust to the significant challenges posed by these trade-offs.  
 
Competitiveness is commonly associated with low prices, however it would be more 
useful to place emphasis on cost-reflective prices that fully internalise externalities. 
The EU ETS is an efficient mechanism for ensuring that the polluter pays but in 
heavily fossil-fuel based systems, it implies increased electricity prices. This raises 
concerns about the possiblility of a loss of industrial competitiveness. To the extent 
that the electricity component in total costs varies by sector, and depending on  the 
distribution of free emissions allowances  and the level of cost pass-through, 
increased prices may have an asymmetric impact on competitiveness from sector to 
sector (Hourcade et al., 2008). Given the diverse resource endowments in the SEE 
region, with for example Albania meeting almost 100% of electricity demand through 
hydro generation and Serbia 60% through coal, there appears to be little incentive for 
governments to adopt policies that will minimise regional emissions. The 
sustainability objective is therefore strongly associated with the energy mix since 
different sources of electricity have different CO2 intensities.  
 
The interaction between policies supporting environmental sustainability and security 
of supply are also complex. Energy security is again intrinsically linked with the 
generation mix. Most nations have a preference for energy independence, though the 
SEE region is, and is likely to remain, a net importer of energy. While the GIS 
forecasts increasing generation from gas, which is less carbon intensive than coal, 
there is little gas in the region which implies increasing import dependency. 
Furthermore, there is an expectation that long term gas prices in this region will 
remain indexed to the oil price, so this expansion path implies increased regional 
exposure to both supply and price shocks.  
 
In sum, the optimal generation mix will be quite different depending on which 
objective is being optimised, competitiveness, security of supply or sustainability. 
And the position will vary from country to country according to resource endowment, 
existing generating plant and attitudes to, for example, nuclear power. It is difficult to 
see how energy policy controlled at national level can result in a coherent regional 
energy policy that reconciles the three objectives.  
 
 
RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH DIFFERENT TYPES OF FUELS 
 
As we described above, the region as a whole has the following generation mix: 40% 
coal, 23% hydro, 23% gas, 7% oil, and 7% nuclear. Most of the coal used in 
electricity production is domestically supplied and according to the GIS report its 
price remains relatively constant through time. The technological characteristics of 
nuclear plant suggest that it is dispatched as base-load generation, with constant 
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output. Nuclear plant is particularly capital intensive, and costs also remain relatively 
constant due to the low proportion of total cost accounted for by fuel cost, and long 
term contracts agreed with fuel suppliers. These two fuel types contribute 47% to the 
total electricity production of the region and could be considered as relatively 
‘controllable’ by a domestic country, i.e. input costs are locally determined. 
 
The usage of the other three types of fuel in electricity production bears certain supply 
risks. One is associated with the supply price risk. For example, gas and oil contribute 
30% to total electricity production. These two types of fuel bear “price risk” because 
none of the South East European countries has significant reserves of either oil or gas, 
while price is determined in world markets. Therefore, all countries in the region are 
price-takers and in a case of any supply/demand shock in the world oil market 
(usually gas price is tied to the price of oil), the countries will have to bear extra input 
costs or adjust their consumption accordingly. Thus, this dependency on oil and gas-
based electricity leads to uncertainty in electricity prices for final consumers and 
feasibility investment projects in the region. 
 
Another dimension of risk is a physical-supply risk associated mainly with the 
production of electricity by hydro electro stations in the regions. Hydropower 
contributes 23% to the total electricity production but is inherently dependent on 
hydrological conditions, particularly as the majority of hydro power plants are run of 
river rather than storage. In dry seasons rivers and even reservoirs become relatively 
empty, which constrains the ability to produce electricity. A high dependency on 
hydro power means that Albania and Bosnia are particularly exposed most to this type 
of risk. But equally, that they would have much to gain in terms of supply security 
from regional market integration, as discussed above. 
 
Finally, we consider briefly environmental risk. There is significant uncertainty about 
the scope of future environmental laws and regulations that may have a significant 
impact on electricity generation within SEE and globally. While agreements reached 
at the 2007 Bali  conference have been generally well received by environmental 
economists there remains considerable uncertaintly about future climate policy. which 
will raise the cost of investing in new generating capacity. At the time of writing, we 
do not have an agreement regarding what may come after the end of the Kyoto 
Protocol agreement in 2012, though we do have a roadmap to guide negotiations over 
the next two years. The problems of the utilization of nuclear energy and the disposal 
of nuclear waste remain unresolved. The heavy reliance in SEE on fossil fuel 
generation means that these types of environmental risks are a very real concern for 
governments, generators and potential investors in new generation capacity. 
 
There is a real danger that public opinion and popular myth regarding price formation 
may motivate resistance to electricity market reform and undermine political 
commitment to, and crucially, investor confidence in the ECSEE project. Experience 
in the Nordic market provides evidence that at least domestic consumers prefer stable 
prices (von der Fehr et al. 2005). An important fact, which is specific to the SEE 
region, is that a high proportion of domestically supplied electricity is consumed by 
households rather than industries. Thus market liberalization is highly politicised. One 
of the major concerns that critics of the liberalization of electricity market express is 
that liberalization would lead to volatility in electricity prices and would hurt 
residential consumers and especially vulnerable groups of the population (Borenstein 
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2005). The fact that the residential consumption is more than 70% of the total final 
consumption in the Albanian economy and more than 50 % for Bosnia, Macedonia 
and Serbia makes it politically extremely difficult to liberalize the electricity market 
in these countries. Any supply/demand shocks would directly affect the population 
and especially vulnerable groups of population, which are a big proportion of 
population in such countries  as Albania. This would increase pressure on national and 
local government to reverse reforms and  continue to subsidize electricity for the 
general population.  
 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
Capital investments, market fragmentation, vertical integration, and state ownership 
are the issues that most of the countries in South East Europe must resolve during the 
restructuring process. An efficient regional energy market would facilitate meeting 
peak demand in individual countries, improve the reliability of and stability of 
electricity supply across the region, encourage private investment and match the 
growing demand for electricity in the long-run. However, each type of fuel bears 
various risks for customers, energy companies and countries. Dependency on such 
types of fuel as hydro and thermal electricity could expose countries to physical 
supply shortages in a case of unfavorable natural or market conditions. Private 
investors would prefer transparency and predictability in regulatory and 
environmental policies when developing nuclear and thermal generation facilities 
rather than risk additional costs of complying with newly introduced stricter 
environmental laws. On the demand side, it is common to hear final consumers 
voicing concerns about price risk that they would bear after the liberalization of the 
electricity market. This fact could lead to an additional political pressure on 
politicians and regulators that could result in a halt or even reverse of reforms in the 
sector. 
 
Carefully designed electricity market integration has the potential to address several 
of the key concerns expressed in contemporary energy policy. The Nordic Market 
suggests that moving from a set of vertically integrated national systems to a regional 
market is possible, and consumers in that region enjoy among the lowest (but cost-
reflective) prices in the EU. But integrating the four systems has taken the best part of 
a decade to achieve, and was motivated by strategic interests of all the players. Levels 
of trust between the parties were high and the required trade-offs were judged to be 
acceptable. 
  
By contrast, the motivation for integration in SEE appears to be on the one hand 
related to aspirations to membership of the EU, and on the other, a growing realisation 
that absent significant investment in generation and transmission capacity, consumers 
may have to accept regular supply shortages, as experienced in Albania in the last 
quarter of 2005.  
 
While the potential gains from regionalisation are significant, and arguably critical to 
the continued economic development of SEE, so too are the institutional and political 
challenges posed by market integration. It is not clear how energy policy controlled at 
national level but with ‘a regional dimension’ will result in a coherent regional energy 
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policy that reconciles the three objectives of EU energy policy, competitiveness, 
security of supply and sustainability. 
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